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THE FIRST of these books' contains seven of Maitland's papers-
the most essential parts of his introduction to the "Memoranda de Par-
liamento 1305," "The Corporation Sole," "The Crown as Corporation,"
"The Unincorporate Body," "Trust and Corporation," "Moral Person-
ality and Legal Personality," "The Body Politic." Mr. Lapsley has
edited the first of these papers, Professor Hazeltine the fourth and fifth,
and Professor Winfield the rest. The papers fall into four groups. The
first deals with constitutional history, the second and third with English
legal history, the third and fourth with the problem of group and cor-
porate personality, and the last with political science.
Since Maitland wrote the first of these papers, much has been written
on the early history of Parliament, and many unpublished Rolls of Par-
liament and other documents relating to Parliament have been printed.
To this large literature Mr. Lapsley's preface is an invaluable guide.
From it, I think, emerges the fact that Maitland's paper began a new
epoch in the study of the early history of Parliament. In this paper, as
in all his other historical work, Maitland tells his story from the original
documents and from the point of view of the men who wrote those
documents; and here, as elsewhere, he portrays the ideas of these men
with amazing clarity. This method of writing the early history of Par-
liament, when applied by a man of unique historical and literary genius,
produced results which were perhaps more revolutionary than those pro-
duced by any of his other works. The reason why it produced these
revolutionary results is as follows: The protagonists in the constitu-
tional conflicts of the seventeenth century had used the events of Par-
liamentary history to prove their political creeds. The victory of Par-
liament in 1688 was thought to have established not only the legal but
also the historical correctness of the views held by those who supported
the Parliament. Thus there was established a traditional view of Par-
liamentary history; and that traditional view had, during the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, coloured the interpretation of the sources, and
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given rise to a set of doctrines as to the constitution of Edward I's
Parliaments which suffered from the fatal defect of looking at medieval
facts from the point of view of the modern theory of the constitution.
Maitland's account of what a Parliament of Edward I's reign really was
and what it really did presented so great a contrast to the received view
on these matters that, as Mr. Lapsley says, it was some time "before
scholars grasped completely the bearings and implications of his essay
or realized how strong a solvent of orthodoxy it was destined to be,"
It was pioneer work- as were many other of Maitland's works; and
though very much has been published on these lines since, it is wonderful
how well his work has stood the test of comparison with the results of
later researches in this field. This fact will be apparent if we look at
some of the conclusions of Messrs. Richardson and Sayles in their
Introduction to the Unedited Rolls of Parliament 1279-1373.2
Maitland insisted that "a session of the king's council is the core
drind essence of every parliamentum." This is accepted as obviously true
by Messrs. Richardson and Sayles when they say: "The king had always
a council round him, a comparatively small body which was largely min-
isterial. On special,occasions this small body would be afforced accord-
ing to the needs of the moment, and parliament was a specially solemn
occasion. Under Edward I the council summoned to parliament prob-
ably varied a great deal in composition; but when really important
business had to be despatched every effort would be made to include
all magnates of influence in church and state, and certainly every highly
placed minister." Maitland pointed out that the records of the audience of,
and the answers to, petitions take the largest space in the roll of 1305;
and precisely the same point is made by Messrs. Richardson and Sayles.
They say also that "the decisions of the council in parliament were apt
to be directions as to the means of obtaining justice or of reaching a
settlement rather than final judgments." Exactly the same thing is said
by Maitland, and. indeed, as Maitland points out, by Hale. Similarly
Maitland's observation that "by no sharp line can the petitions of the
assembled lords and commons be marked off from the general mass of
petitions" is said by Messrs. Richardson and Sayles to be generally
true; but they think that some of this class of petitions did not pass
through the hands of the receivers and triers, but went straight to the
council. These few illustrations show the soundness of Maitland's con-
clusions. They show that the soundness of those conclusions was due
to his capacity for seeing into the minds of those who composed the
documents which he was interpreting-a capacity which has never been
equalled by any other historian.
2. ROTULI PARLIAMENTORUM- ANGLIE HACTENUS INEFDITI MCCLXXIX-M1CCCLX XIII,
Camden Soc., 3d series, vol. 1i (1935).
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The fourth and fifth of these papers on "Trust and Corporation"
and "Moral Personality and Legal Personality," are two of the most
important papers in this collection. They have been very well edited by
Professor Hazeltine. He has translated the German phrases, he has
added notes which give references to books in which Maitland's theories
have been discussed, and at the end he has given us a comprehensive
bibliography of the continental and English literature on these subjects.
These papers are important because in them 1Maitland introduced Eng-
lish 'lawyers to a new body of thought, and explained why it was a
new body of thought to Englishmen. Both his account of the conti-
nental controversies to which it had given rise, and his explanation why
these controversies had had no English counterpart, shed a new light
on English institutions and English law.
The accepted continental theory of corporations had unduly restricted
liberty of association. It was generally held that the only persons whom
the State would recognize were either natural persons or fictitious per-
sons. Fictitious persons were corporations; and it was only the sover-
eign who could create a fictitious person. The logical consequence of
this view was what is known as the "Concession Theory"-"the corpor-
ation is, and must be, the creature of the State. Into its nostrils the
State must breathe the breath of a fictitious life, for otherwise it would
be no associated body but individualistic dust."' Thus the existence of
all groups and communities were subordinated to the will of a sover-
eign State. Under the influence of this theory the old communities
of the Middle Ages were dissolved, and therefore the liberty to associate
was strictly limited. It was not till the beginning of the twentieth
century that French law relaxed these limitations. In these circumstances
those who desired to obtain a greater liberty of association attacked the
theory upon which these limitations were based. Associations, it was
said, were not fictitious. They were real things, as real as the human
beings who composed them. They did not depend for their existence
on the authorization of the State. The State therefore should recognize
them in the same way and for the same reasons as it recognizes natural
men. Thus the question whether group personality was fictitious or
real became an important practical question because upon it depended
the extent of the liberty of association and the powers of these associa-
tions.
Maitland pointed out that this had never been so important a prac-
tical question in England, partly because English law had never ceased
to recognize some of the medieval communities such as counties and
hundreds and Inns of Court, and partly because it had in the Trust
a medium whereby many different associations could live and flourish
3. Gimr, POLITICAL THEORIES OF rlE MiDLE AGE (1900) X.M
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without any authorization by the State. For the first time he pointed
out the importance in this connection of that medieval element in Eng-
lish law, the survival of which had been secured by the victory of the
Parliament and the common law in the seventeenth century; and for
the first time he pointed out the significance of the Trust Concept in
our public and semi-public law. What theories English lawyers had
had upon corporate personality were of a superficial kind; for, like other
branches of the common law, the law as to corporations had grown up
gradually and depended very little upon philosophical theory. Maitland's
papers set lawyers thinking, and made them realize the need to acquire
some clearer ideas as to the theoretical foundations upon which their
law rested. I think that the result of that investigation has been to show
that in the main the common law view of corporate personality is a
sensible theory; but that the somewhat hand-to-mouth manner in which
it has grown up has had its dangers, more especially in these latter years
when the liberty to associate allowed by the common law, and the ease
with which statutes allow corporatd form to be assumed, have multi-
plied both the number and power of these various associations. The
following conclusions have, I think, emerged:
In the first place, the question whether corporate personality is real
or fictitious, though practically important in continental speculation be-
cause it was bound up with the question of liberty of association, is
not fundamentally important for lawyers. The law recognizes persons,
not from the biological point of view, but as the subjects of rights and
duties. That being so, a group of persons, corporate or otherwise, which
is the subject of rights and duties, is a person no les* and no more than
a natural person. No doubt it is a different sort of person because it
is artificial. and no doubt its artificial quality gives it a different legal
status. But it is iust as real a person as a natural person. As Professor
1.-.\. Smith has said.4 "'a confusion is sometimes created by not dis-
tinguishing clearly between the legal and the philosophical, or the legal
and the historical aspects of the matter. Thus, for example, if we ask
the familiar question 'Has the corporation a real group will as distinct
from that of its individual members?' the answer will usually be for
the philosopher. The lawyer is under no obligation to answer such a
question. and the law does not generally provide him with an answer
unless litigation has proved or legislation has anticipated its necessity.
Now it is almost impossible to imagine any law suit in which the judge
must find himself driven to pronounce upon the existence or non-exist-
ence of a group-will. The semi-philosophical expressions we find here
and there in the Reports are invariably obiter dicta, and the true method
of handling, or rather refusing to handle, such questions is well illus-
4. SaH. THE LAW oF AssocIATIONs (1914) 128-129.
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trated by the Privy Council in Citizens Life Assurance Company v.
Brown' where Lord Lindley says: 'If it is once granted that corpora-
tions are for civil purposes to be regarded as persons, i. e., as principals
acting by agents and servants, it is difficult to see why the ordinary
doctrines of agency and of master and servant are not to be applied to
corporations as well as to ordinary individuals'."
Secondly and consequently, the common law, without indulging in
much speculation as to the nature of a corporation's personality, has
evolved the common sense view that a corporation has, so far as is
consistent with its artificial nature and with the purpose with which it
is created, the capacities and liabilities of a natural man.
Thirdly, the common law has always adhered to the rule that cor-
porate form can be conferred only by the State. Those continental
speculators who wished to get a larger liberty of association thought
that, when they had disproved the fictitious nature of corporate person-
ality and proved its reality, they had also proved the falsity of the
Concession Theory. They thought that from the proof of its reality
it followed that no authorization of the State was needed for its recog-
nition as a legal persona. But this conclusion really rests upon a con-
fusion of thought which is due to the circumstances in which the con-
tinental controversies had arisen. It is perhaps arguable that it is a
weak spot in Maitland's brilliant exposition of these continental theories
that he does not clearly point out that proof that unincorporate groups
have a real life of their own, though it disproves the Fiction Theory,
has no logical bearing on the Concession Theory. Therefore the com-
mon law, while admitting to the reality of corporate and, to some extent,
of group personality, has always adhered to the Concession Theory.
I think that it may be maintained that it was because the law recognized
the reality of the life of a group that it insisted that, for a legal life,
it must have the authority of the State. The State is thus able to
impose conditions which will prevent these corporate groups from men-
acing the peace of the State and the liberty of the individual.
But fourthly, the gradual and untheoretic way in which the English
law as to groups and associations has grown up was dangerous in an
age which demanded this liberty to associate in groups which tended
to increase in size and power. The absence of any clear theory as to
the basis of the law caused law yers and legislators to ignore this danger.
It caused them to ignore the implications of Burke's aphorism that
"liberty when men act in bodies is power." The excessive liberty given
to Trade Unions, and the absence of all power in the Company Acts
to provide any machinery for disincorporating a company which is
guilty of wrong-doing, are illustrations.
5. [19041 A. C. 423, 426.
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For all these reasons I think that it may be maintained that these
papers of Maitland, though dealing largely with speculations evoked
by causes which are not operative in England, are of great importance
to English lawyers and statesmen. They are important, first because
they have elucidated the theories adopted by English law upon the topic
of corporate and unincorporate personality; secondly because they point
to certain defects in that law; and thirdly because they elucidate the
historical importance of certain aspects of English public law, and in
particular the large part which the Trust Concept has played in differ-
ent branches of public and semi-public law. They are of great im-
portance to students of jurisprudence because they contain clear reasoning
upon fundamental principles and problems which helps students to think
for themselves. They are of great importance to students of compara-
tive law because they show in the clearest way the divergent manner
in which, under the stress of different conditions, similar problems are
discussed and solved.
The two papers on "The Corp6ration Sole" and "The Crown as
Corporation" are studies in two topics of English legal history which
had been very little explored till Maitland wrote about them. They are
interesting histories of the failure to adapt the new law, which was
beginning to grow up round the corporation, to old bodies of legal
doctrine, which had been elaborated in the days when this new law had
not been heard of. But I think that the failure of the attempt to apply
the conception of a corporation sole to the Crown was due, not so much,
as Maitland would seem to suggest, to the conception itself, as to the
course of English constitutional history. Parliament won its victory
over the Crown with the help of medieval precedents which regarded
the King as a natural man. Those precedents assorted badly with the
doctrines of the Tudor lawyers which made the King a corporation
sole, the head and representative of the State, and the possessor of many
mystical qualities. If the Stuart Kings and the prerogative lawyers had
had their way King and State would have been identified, and the con-
ception of a corporation sole might have been valuable. But the result
of the victory of the Parliament was that the Crown, though it remained
a corporation sole with many extraordinary qualities, did not become
coextensive with the State. The ambiguous position which the Crown
thus occupied between the old theories and the new accounts for the
failure of the concept of the Crown as a corporation sole. The two
papers on "The Unincorporate 'Body" and "The Body Politic" are less
important. The first deals mainly with the relation of the Trust Con-
cept to corporation law, and explains why it has "given us a liberal
substitute for a meagre law of corporations." The second enters a
protest against the view that "we are within measurable distance of a
(Vol. 46 : 801806
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sociology or an inductive political science which shall take no shame
when set beside the older sciences."
In Mr. Brunyate's new edition of Maitland's Lectures on Equity"
the text has very wisely been left unchanged, except for the omission
of two passages dealing with topics which have been rendered obsolete
by the Property Legislation of 1925. In fact Mr. Brunyate tells us
that, because the book deals mainly with the basic principles of equity,
"surprisingly little revision has been found necessary." But the foot-
notes, which were not Maitland's work, have been added to and altered.
In addition Mr. Brunyate has added six notes which deal with the cases
of Oliver v. Hinton7 and Walker v. Linom,8 Restrictive Covenants,
Trusts, the Law of Property since 1925, the Administration of Assets,
and Election. Mr. Brunyate has done his editorial work very skilfully,
and his notes are just what is wanted-not too long, and at the same
time clear and accurate. The book will be more valuable than ever as
an introductory book for students, and it will still be valued by all
lawyers, because it continues to describe in Maitland's clear and effective
style the root principles of equity, the relation of equity to law, and its
place in the English legal system.9
I regret that Mr. Brunyate has not given us his opinion as to Mait-
land's thesis that equitable rights are essentially jura in personam; for,
as he says, Maitland's views on this point "pervade the book and are
of the essence of it." Mr. Brunyate thinks that the discussion and
criticism of Maitland's views on this point are not the function of a
reviser. I think that he might easily have given us another note on
this topic. In fact the excellence of the notes which he has given us
will cause his readers to regret the omission.
My own opinion on this controverted topic is that it is the one case
in which Maitland's views upon equity have been materially modified
by subsequent discussion. I think that this modification is justified by
two reasons. In the first place, there is weighty authority against Mait-
land's views; and, in the second place, his insistence on the predominately
personal character of equitable rights obscures the true nature of equit-
able ownership:
6. 2NArFLANxD, op. cit. mpra note 1.
7. [1899] 2 Ch. 264.
8. [1907] 2 CI. 104.
9. There is only one remark that I should like to make about the text. It is
curious that at page 45, where the relation of debtor and creditor is contrasted with
the relation of trustee and cestld que trust, neither Maitland nor Mr. Brunyate cites
the case of Lister v. Stubbs, 45 Ch. Div. 1 (1890), which turns on this very difference.
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First, authority is against Maitland. Lindley, L. J., in the case of
Lister v. Stubbs,"0 and Lord Parker in the case of Sinclair v. Brougham,11
emphasized the proprietary character of equitable rights. In the former
case Lindley, L. J., said that the fallacy of the plaintiff's argument was
in failing to distinguish between the debtor-creditor and the trustee-
cestui que trust relation "in confounding oiunership with obligation." 2
In the latter case Lord Parker said that equity, "starting from a per-
sonal equity, based on the consideration that it would be unconscionable
for anyone who could not plead purchase for value without notice to
retain an advantage derived from the misapplication of trust money, it
ended, as was so often the case, in creating wxhat were in effect rights
of property, though not recognized as such by the common law."" 3
Secondly, I think the insistence of the predominately personal char-
acter of equitable rights obscures the true nature of equitable ownership.
No doubt a cestui que trust has rights in personarn against his trustee;
but he has many other rights both against his trustee and against third
persons. It is these other rights wfiich give him equitable ownership.
What then is this equitable ownership? The answer is that its main
characteristic is the fact that it is a right as against all the world except
as against a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the legal
estate. This characteristic is due to the relation in which equity has
always stood to the law. Equity has always followed the law, and, when
the equities are equal, has always allowed the law to prevail. It seems
to me impossible to say that ownership of this character has not got
predominately proprietary characteristics merely because there is one pos-
sible person as against whom it cannot be asserted. Indeed it is impos-
sible to maintain this thesis without denying the existence of equitable
ownership-which seems to me to be absurd. At any rate the doctrine
of following trust property shows that, whatever the law might say,
equity always regarded these equitable rights as something very different
from merely personal obligations; for the essence of that doctrine is this
-even if the property has got into the hands of a bona fide purchaser
for value, so that the equitable ownership of it has ceased to exist, the
former owner is given a proprietary right to or in any property which
can be identified as its proceeds, and is thus enabled to take it in prefer-
ence to creditors whose rights are merely personal.
In the first edition of the Lectures on Equity there was included a
set of "Lectures on the Forms of Action." The latter set of lectures
10. 45 Ch. Div. 1 (1890).
11. [1914] A. C. 398.
12. Lister v. Stubbs, 45 Ch. Div. 1, 15 (1890). The italics are mine.
13. Sinclair v. Brougham, [1914] A. C. 398. 441-442. The italics are mine.
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have been detached from the Lectures on Equity, and are printed in their
original form and without annotation in a separate volume.14 Of that
volume it is only necessary to say that it is still an indispensable intro-
ductory volume to the study of English legal history. There .has, it is
true, been some controversy as to the connection of Chapter 24 of the
Statute of Westminster II"' with action on the case.10 It is possible that
it may be necessary to revise somewhat the traditional view which Mait-
land states. 7 With that exception these lectures hold the field as the
best 'account for the beginner, and, like all Maitland's work, however
elementary, they have much that is of value to the mature student.
Sir Frederick Pollock has said of Maine's writings that "they are
classics in their kind, and accordingly their standard and worth are little
or not at all affected by the changes which the learning of posterity may
bring to specific propositions contained or assumed in them ;" 's and of his
genius he has said that it "was not only touched with art, but eminently
artistic; and art is immortal." 9 This and more than this can be said
of Maitland's writings. He was more alive than Maine to the human
aspects of the history of law. It is easy, as I have said elsewhere, when
dealing with theories, and doctrines, and institutions, to forget that they
were made and used and developed and abused by men of like passions
with ourselves. Maitland never forgot this. He can extract human traits
from a plea roll and a Year Book. And this characteristic of his genius
was developed by his sense of humour and his gaiety of manner which
conceal the learning and research underlying the brilliant argument which
flows so easily. Moreover, to this sense of humour and this gaiety there
must be added a talent for epigram, which clinches the argument, and
sums up in some memorable phrase the conclusion of the whole matter.
And I think that it can be maintained also that Maitland was a greater
lawyer and legal historian than Maine. He was one of the great lawyers
of his age, and one of the greatest historians, legal or otherwise, that
this country has ever produced. This may seem to be an extravagant
claim. But I am not alone in this opinion. Mr. G. M. Young in his
brilliant picture of Victorian England has said: "I dwell on the name
of Maitland partly because, outside his own profession, England has
14. MATTLAND, Op. cit. supra note 1.
15. Statute of Westminster 2d, 1285, 13 EDW. I, c. 24.
16. Plucknett, Case and the Statute of Westminster II (1931) 31 COL. L Rv.
778: Landon, The Action on the Case atnd the Statute of Westminster II (1936) 52
L. Q. REv. 68; Plucknett, Case and Westminster II (1936) 52 L Q. REv. 220.
17. (1931) 47 L. Q. REv. 334.
18. POLLOCK. OXFORD LECTURES (1890) 151.
19. Id. at 154.
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never done justice to that royal intellect, at once as penetrating and com-
prehensive as any historian has ever possessed: but more because no
other English writer has so perfectly apprehended the final and dominant
object of historical study: which is, the origin, content, and articulation
of that objective mind which controls the thinking and doing of an age
or race, as our mother tongue controls our speaking; or possessed, in so
full a measure, the power of entering into that mind, thinking with its
equipment, judging by its canons, and observing with its perceptions." 20
To us who are lawyers he is one of those fixed stars who takes his
place with such men as Bracton, Littleton, Coke, Hale, and Blackstone.
And because he takes this rank students will always wish to study his
ipsissima verba, to know what his views were, even though it has been
proved by later research that they must be modified. It seems to me that
in these circumstances what is wanted is not so much selected fragments
of his works with annotations, as the works themselves. What is wanted
is two or three omnibus volumes printed on thin paper in legible type
which contain all he wrote. I should exclude the History of English Law,
but nothing else. All else, beginning with his introduction to The Select
Pleas of the Crown for the County of Gloucester, and including his in-
troductions to Bracton's Note Book and to the volumes of the Selden
Society, which he edited, ought to be printed exactly as he wrote them.
No introduction would be needed-merely a list of important dates in
his life; and of course the dates of publication would be affixed to each
work. I am sure that these volumes would satisfy a want which has
long been felt by lawyers and historians. I am sure that they would have
a rapid sale, and that the demand for them would continue, even as the
demand for the works of the other classics of our legal and historical
literature continues. Many of these books were published by the Cam-
bridge University Press, and that Press ought to publish these omnibus
volumes. Let us hope that the Syndics of that Press will see that it
is to their interest not to refuse thus to recognize the needs of students,
and the outstanding qualities of Maitland's work-prophet though he is
from their own country.
20. YOUNG, VICTORIAN ENGLAND, THE PORTRAIT OF AN AGE (1934) 185-186.
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